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1. There is a very long history of recognition of the river 
 basin as the natural unit for river development, planning 
and management. 
 
2. In the U.S. and internationally, there is also a long 
history of breaking up river basins among many 
jurisdictions, most having little to do with water. 
 
3. The costs of failure to focus on the river basin are 
rising rapidly ("jurisdictional externalities" are increasing). 
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4.  Question: Can we move back toward the river basin 
from the current splintered framework to achieve “win-
win” improvements? How? 
 
 
Historical Emphases on the River Basin. 
 
6000 B.C., origins of large-scale irrigation in Tigris-  
  Euphrates Valley 
 
4000 B.C., Chinese attempts to control the Yellow River 
 
2300 B.C., Indus Basin settled and managed by central  
  authority. 
 
1600 B.C., Dujianyang irrigation/flood control project on 
                   Min River (China) 
 
1526+, Mughal Empire in India, new techniques of river 
 management. 
 
 All  required huge work forces and centralized controls and 
 were the subjects of Wittfogel’s writings on “hydraulic 
 societies” and “oriental despotism”. 
 Great exception: Egypt experienced 5000 years of  
sustained irrigated agricultural production by its 
decentralized system of basin irrigation, in spite of vast 
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political changes among the ruling class. Not possible to 
manage the Nile with extant technology. 
 (Reference: Howe, Charles W., 2002, "Historical Innovations in Water 
Management, Water Services, Institutions and Technologies", Oxford Encyclopedia of 
Economic History, Oxford University Press). 
 
Modern Emphases on the River Basin. 
 
 
1824, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established and 
 charged with maintaining navigability of the major 
 rivers and harbor maintenance. 
 
1830+, French Ecole National de Ponts et Chaussees   
 promotes unified river management and develops 
 basics of benefit-cost analysis (Jules Dupuis). Agences 
 de Basin still in effect today in France (Ekelund & 
  Hebert, 1973). 
 
1907, U.S. Inland Waterways Commission under 
Roosevelt’s “gospel of efficiency” recommends multi-
purpose river development and centralized control of 
the rivers. John Wesley Powell heads Geological 
Survey(Hays, 1958). 
 
1930’s: Depression emergency legislation strengthened 
 federal government coordination, created TVA (with 
 no state consultation) and effected tight coordination 
 among federal water agencies. 
 
1948, British River Boards (England & Wales) established  
with subsequent extensions of functions to become 
regional river authorities. 
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1958:  Krutilla and Eckstein’s 1958 Multiple Purpose River  
Development: an early application of economics to 
river basin planning . 
 
1965, Water Resources Planning Act creates Water 
Resources Council that to coordinate federal  
water agencies and authorizes river basin 
commissions. Some achievements but little money & 
 veto power of members. 
 
 
1968-73, National Water Commission emphasizes the river 
basin. Excellent but neglected report. Gary Hart study 
 of river basin commissions (1971). 
 
1980’s, Technical capabilities for remote & satellite 
 monitoring in real time expands capability for basin 
 administration. South Platte example of whole-basin 
 water rights administration. (Kilgour & Dinar, 2001); 
 Bennett & Shope, 2000 on real time basin 
 optimization. 
 
1998, Western Water Policy Review Advisory  
Commission: recommends emphasis on river basins,  
watershed initiatives and their merger. 
 
2001: Inter-American Development Bank backs river basin 
 planning for water quality management (Russell, 
 Vaughn et al). 
 
2002: Brazil's Agencia Nacional de Agua initiates program 






Developments in the Other Direction. 
 
A. Many federal policies, regulations and laws have 
intentionally reduced federal control over water:  
 
     1877 Desert Land Act: settlers must claim water under 
   state law; 
     1897 National Forest Act: water users on public domain  
  must comply with state law; 
     1902 Reclamation Act: projects must acquire water in  
  conformity with state law; 
     1920 Federal Power Act: instream  flow rights must be 
   claimed  under state law; 
     1988 McCarren Amendment: all federal agencies must  
  claim water under state law except Winters' Doc. 
 
B. Reagan administration abolished Water Resources 
Council and related river basin commissions, 1982. Loss 
of Federal coordination. Current revival of interest WRC.  
 
C. Resultant mixed policy picture:  
1. Federal government retains control over navigable 
 rivers and their tributaries; 
2. International treaty power over-rides all state water 
laws; 
3. Army Corps of Engineer programs (primarily flood 
control) never subject to state control; 
4. AZ v. CA, 1963: Secretary of Interior given control 
over lower Colorado River. 
5. Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act over-
ride state water administration as needed. 
6. Secretary of Interior states that states must find 
solutions to water problems (2004). 
7. Popularity of local watershed initiatives raises 
question of compatibility with basin objectives 
(Kenney et al, 2000). 
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Evidence that failure to focus on the river basin is  
increasingly costly. 
 
A. Past and current status of the Colorado River (Booker   
severe, sustained drought study,1995): majority of 
drought damage under Law of the River was to non-
consumptive uses; damage to consumptive uses reduced 
85% through intra-state re-allocation. 
 
B. Problems on the Upper & Middle Rio Grande (Booker, 
Michelsen & Ward, 2005): drought damages reduced 
20-33% by elimination of compact and stateline barriers. 
 
C. Losses on the Lower Rio Grande (Texas Center for 
Policy Studies, 2002; Tidwell et al, 2004; Stubbs et al, 
2004): Complex history leads to inefficient allocation. 
 
D. Failure of agreement on the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint Basins in Southeast (Lipford, 
2004): endless litigation & no settlement. 
 
E. Klamath River controversy of 2001. "Water bank" 
established to lease irrigation water for instream use 
(USGAO, 2005). 
 
F. Idaho faces losses from lack of coordinated surface 
water-groundwater management on the Snake. 
 
G. International river basins facing increasing conflict: 
Nile, Ganges, Mekong, Okavango. 
 
H. Crises are forcing consideration of new compacts, new 
"laws of the river", revisions of sacrosanct regulations & 




Where are we headed? Is it possible to move toward 
basin-wide planning/management starting from the 
current splintered framework? 
 
A. Interstate transfers are taking place:  
     
  1. Arizona-Nevada water banking: AZ recharges 
    excess CAP water for future use, exchanging that 
    water for Nevada withdrawals from Lake Mead.  
1.25 maf guaranteed for $ 100 million up front plus 
 full costs of recharge and recovery.  
 
 2. Arizona-MWD water exchange: NV's excess River 
     water stored & used by MWD, later foregoing 
     withdrawals in favor of NV. 
 
   3. Deschutes Resources Conservancy restores  
       streamflows on interstate river (CA-OR) by leasing 
       agricultural water. 
 
 
B. New monitoring and surveillance technologies have 
increased capabilities of administering river basins as a 
whole on "win-win" bases.  South Platte example; Dinar-
Kilgour (1995,2001);  Lewis, Howe & Shope, 2000). 
 
C. Applying the Columbia River Treaty principle of 
“benefit sharing” in place of just water sharing (Krutilla, 
1958). 
 
D. Compensation policies need strengthening to reconcile 
efficiency & equity as changes are made. Examples: City 
of Aurora payments to counties of origin; "Windy Gap" 
Project compensation to ranchers & counties. 
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E. Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act are forcing 
interstate cooperation: 3 state Platte River agreement; 
Middle Rio Grande; Colorado River species restoration. 
 
F. Expanding the geographical scale of water markets: 
 1. intra-state gains potential is large (Vaux & Howitt,  
     1994; Booker, 1995); 
 
  2. historical proposals that didn't fly: 
   
a. Ben Harding (1984 paper) proposes leasing of  
 unused Colorado consumptive allotments. 
 
b. the Galloway proposal (Gross,1985): dams on 
the White & Yampa Rivers in Colorado to 
lease water to Lower Basin. Legal objections: 
Colorado River Compact "exclusive use", 
Congressional intent, Upper Basin Compact. 
 
 c. Resource Conservation Group Proposal  
    (1990) : reduce irrigated acreage in Colorado 
     on a rotating basis, leasing reduced 
     consumptive use to Lower Basin. Objections: 
    "exclusive use" in CRC; contrary to intent of    
     CRC; measuring consumptive use (Viscoli,  
     1991). 
 
d.  Rep. Ben Nighthorse Campbell proposes 
     leasing to the Lower Basin the water decreed   
         for unbuilt projects authorized under the     
      Colorado River Project Act. 
    
  e.  Colorado River Board of California Proposal          
       for an Interstate Water Bank on the Colorado  
        River (1991): to allow 1-year interstate leasing 
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     of "wet water"  through state water agencies  
     under umbrella of  7-state bank at fixed prices.  
     Objections: California's need to reduce use to 
   4.4 maf/yr; need for reallocation within 
       California. Colorado adamantly opposed. 
 
  f. 1991 Governor Roy Romer (Colorado)proposes 
      state-to-state leasing of unused consumptive  
      use allotments through contracts to forego  
      development for 40 years. 
 
G. Increasing flexibility of interstate compacts. Interstate 
  compacts frozen in time (Muys, 2001). New or 
 revised compacts should facilitate interstate water 
 banking. In my view such arrangements are necessary 
 legal and inevitable in many basins (Muys, 2004)  
 
 
H. Problems with Interstate Water markets: 
  
1. Who protects  instream values? Booker (1995) 
found that major losses from extended drought were 
to instream uses (water quality, eco-systems, 
recreation, hydro-power). Public & private agencies 
can lease water through water banks: Idaho Power 
from agriculture (2001 & other years) and Bureau 
of Reclamation on the Klamath (USGAO, 2005). 
 
 2. Will water markets/banks really work? Colorado 
     established a water bank in the Arkansas River    
     Valley that simply did not work. No transactions. 
 
3.Property rights in water are uncertain, e. g. real  
   Upper Basin allocations under the Compact and the      






1. Activate the California water bank proposal on a 
  trial basis. Very conservative arrangement. 
 
2. Authorize and encourage federal & state agencies to 
  lease water through water banks for protection of 
 instream values. 
 
3. Further evaluate a "Romer-type" contractual leasing 
 arrangement between Upper Basin and Lower 
 Basin states  to reward Upper Basin conservation 
 & discourage unproductive project commitments 
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Establish True Basin-Wide 
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The Return to the River Basin as the Unit of 
Management.
Professor Chuck Howe
Environment & Behavior Program
Institute of Behavioral Science
University of Colorado-Boulder
Resume of Main Points
There is a long history of focusing on the river 
basin as the unit of planning and management.
• There is also a long history of dividing the river 
basin up among political jurisdictions.
• Costs of failing to focus on the river basin are 
rising sharply.
• There are “win-win” steps that can take us in the 
direction of the river basin.
• Ref: Howe, “The Return to the River Basin…”,Jour. Contemporary 
Water Research & Education, May, 2005.
Steps Toward Basin-Wide 
Cooperation and Management.
• History of states’ cooperation in basin-wide 
institutions: states collaborate when purpose is 
well-focused.
• Remote sensing extends potential scope of 
basin management & allows all parties to 
monitor withdrawals, storage, etc., increasing 
trust and enforcement of agreements (Kilgour-
Dinar,2001;EOS 5/05).
• “Benefit sharing”: the U.S.-Canada Columbia 
River Case (John Krutilla, 1967).
Extending Water Markets to 
Interstate Levels
• Need to clarify states’ water property rights, e.g. 
uncertainties in Upper & Lower Basin compacts.
• 1984 Galloway proposal to lease 1 maf of 
Yampa/White water to lower basin. Issues: 
Yampa, Compact III(a) & Congressional intent.
• 1984 Ben Harding (Hydrosphere) suggests 
leasing of Colorado’s unused consumptive 
allotment.
• 1990 Resource Conservation Group “wet water”
proposal to lease foregone consumptive use 
with sharing of proceeds. Issues: III(a), 
accounting problems, “spirit of the compact”.
• 1991 Colorado River Board of California 
“Conceptual Approach & Water Bank    
Proposal”:
– 1 year interstate leases through the bank on a state-
to-state basis;
– transactions first cleared with state agency;
– “wet water” only not exceeding 1 maf/year;
– price set annually by Interstate Forum (problem);
– Proposal solidly rejected by Colo.Gov. Romer & other 
Upper Basin governments.
• 1991. Gov. Roy Romer proposal to 
contract with Lower Basin for payment for 
non-development of unused consumptive 
allotment.
• Appears justified by current NV-AZ-CA 
arrangements for groundwater & surface 
storage.
Protecting Instream Values.
• Charge state & federal agencies to protect 
instream values through market leasing:
-- Booker et al find instream losses greatest 
during extended drought in the Colorado 
River; examples of leasing for instream use:
– 2001. Idaho Power leases ag water from 400 
farmers at $ 450/acre, 150,000 acres (Colby);
– Reclamation leases water on the Klamath for 
instream purposes (U.S. GAO, March, 2005).
Increasing Flexibility of Interstate 
Compacts.
• “…compact allocations, unlike decrees in 
equitable apportionment…, are frozen in 
time…” (Muys, Feb. 2001).
• “…new or revised compacts should 
provide authority… to facilitate interstate 
… water banking on a voluntary basis…In 
my view, such arrangements are 
necessary, legal and inevitable in many 
interstate basins.” (Muys, May, 2004).
Principles for the Design of Flexible 
Compacts
• (Personal notes from Utton Center 3/05 
workshop on model interstate compacts):
– Allow for adaptive management:”expect the 
unexpected”;
– Maximize basin-wide economic benefits while 
allowing for equitable division of benefits thru  
compensation & allocation of hydrologic risk;
– Protect riparian systems and cultural values;
– Allow for the role of science.
Recommendations.
• Activate the California water bank 
proposal on a trial basis.
• Authorize & encourage public agencies to 
lease water through the bank for 
protection of instream values.
• Further evaluate a Romer-type contractual 
arrangement to reward Upper Basin 
conservation & discourage low productivity 
Upper Basin projects.
